Baltic-nordic relations: implications for baltic security by Kadunce, Wendell H.
www.ssoar.info
Baltic-nordic relations: implications for baltic
security
Kadunce, Wendell H.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kadunce, W. H. (1995). Baltic-nordic relations: implications for baltic security. (Berichte / BIOst, 9-1995). Köln:
Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-49088
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Die  Meinungen,  die  in  den  vom  bundesinstitut  für  ostwissenschaftliche  und  internationale  studien 
herausgegebenen  Veröffentlichungen  geäußert  werden,  geben  ausschließlich  die  Auffassung  der  Autoren 
wieder.© 1995 by Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Köln
Abdruck  und  sonstige  publizistische  Nutzung  -  auch  auszugsweise  -  nur  mit  vorheriger 
Zustimmung des Bundesinstituts sowie mit Angabe des Verfassers und der Quelle gestattet.
Bundesinstitut  für  ostwissenschaftliche  und  internationale  Studien,  Lindenbornstr.  22,  D-
50823  Köln,
Telefon  0221/5747-0,  Telefax  0221/5747-110
ISSN 0435-7183
Inhalt
Seite
Kurzfassung
.......................................................................................................
3
Introduction
.......................................................................................................
6
The End of the ”Nordic Balance” and its Meaning for Baltic Security
.......................................................................................................
9
Why Baltic-Nordic Relations?
.......................................................................................................
11
Current Relations
.......................................................................................................
12
Provisions and Organization of Nordic Assistance to the Baltic states
.......................................................................................................
13
Economic Assistance
.......................................................................................................
14
The Baltic Investment Program
.......................................................................................................
15
Contribution Agreement...........................................................................................................15
Political and limited Military Assistance
.......................................................................................................
17
The ”Support of Sovereignty”
.......................................................................................................
18
Baltic Efforts
.......................................................................................................
20
Environmental Assistance
.......................................................................................................
23
Proposals for Baltic-Nordic Cooperation
.......................................................................................................
26
Conclusion
.......................................................................................................
29
Nordic Initiatives-Implications for Baltic Security...................................................................30
Increasing the Ties to the West.................................................................................................30
Breaking the Binds of East European Isolation........................................................................31
References
.......................................................................................................
34
Summary
.......................................................................................................
36
15. Oktober 1994
Der  Verfasser  arbeitet  als  Konsultant  bei  der  Politikberatungsfirma  CHEMONICS 
INTERNATIONAL in  Washington,  D.C.,  und ist  dort  fachlich  für  Mittel-  und Osteuropa 
zuständig.
Redaktion: Gerhard Wettig im Zusammenwirken mit Sabine Fischer.
Baltic-Nordic Relations§ 3
Wendell H. Kadunce
Baltic-Nordic Relations
Implications for Baltic Security
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 9/1995
Kurzfassung
Vorbemerkung
Seit dem Ende des Ost-West Konfliktes sehen die baltischen Staaten sich mit einem Sicher­
heitsdilemma konfrontiert: Einerseits versuchen sie seit Erlangung der Unabhängigkeit 1991, 
aus ihrer Bindung an Osteuropa auszubrechen und sich enger an den Westen anzulehnen; 
andererseits  steht dieses Streben im Widerspruch zu russischen Interessen und zu den auf 
Rußland konzentrierten Wünschen des Westens. Im vorliegenden Bericht wird die Ansicht 
vertreten, daß nationale Sicherheit in zunehmendem Maße von internationalen und transnatio­
nalen  Umständen  abhängt.  Vor  diesem Hintergrund  wird  die  Sonderrolle  der  Nordischen 
Staaten bei der Lösung des baltischen Sicherheitsdilemmas innerhalb Europas analysiert. Die 
Arbeit wurde vor dem Ende des russischen Truppenrückzugs aus dem Baltikum und vor den 
Referenden über den EU-Beitritt in Schweden, Finnland und Norwegen abgeschlossen.
Ergebnisse
1. Mit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes eröffnen sich neue Möglichkeiten der regionalen 
Organisation in Nordeuropa. Dabei scheint eine engere Kooperation der baltischen und der 
nordischen Staaten aus verschiedenen Gründen sinnvoll: Von seiten der nordischen Staa­
ten herrscht ein an der eigenen nationalen Sicherheit orientiertes Interesse an der Stabilität 
der baltischen Region. Eine wichtige Rolle spielen historische und kulturelle Bindungen, 
und schließlich die Perspektive künftiger wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen.
2. Die gegenwärtigen Beziehungen der baltischen Staaten zu Nordeuropa unterscheiden sich 
voneinander. Da die Politiken der drei Länder nicht aufeinander abgestimmt sind, befinden 
sie sich in einem Konkurrenzverhältnis um nord- bzw. gesamteuropäische Unterstützung. 
Die Beziehungen zu den nordeuropäischen Staaten traten erstmals besonders hervor, als 
diese die drei jungen Republiken als souverän anerkannten, während ihnen die Anerken­
nung international noch versagt blieb.
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3. Die ökonomische Unterstützung der baltischen durch die  nordischen Staaten setzt  sich 
zusammen  aus  einem  gemeinsamen  5-Punkte-Investitionsprogramm,  bilateralen 
Initiativen,  sowie  einem  Freihandelsabkommen  für  die  beiden  Regionen.  Besonderes 
Gewicht wird dabei auf die Schaffung einer marktwirtschaftlichen Infrastruktur als Basis 
für  die  Konsolidierung  der  wirtschaftlichen  Reformen  gelegt.  Mit  diesen 
Unterstützungsmaßnahmen  soll  den  baltischen  Republiken  der  Weg  zur  EU-
Mitgliedschaft geebnet werden.
4. Auf politischem Gebiet fällt den Staaten Nordeuropas die schwierige Rolle des Vermittlers 
zwischen Rußland und dem Baltikum zu. Die dabei behandelten Fragen berühren auch die 
Sicherheitsinteressen der nordischen Staaten. Außerdem verhält sich der Westen auf politi­
schem Gebiet sehr zurückhaltend, um nicht mit russischen Interessen zu kollidieren. Das 
so entstandene Vakuum füllen die nordeuropäischen Länder.
5. Die Staaten Nordeuropas wirken gezielt am Aufbau von Polizei- und Grenztruppen in den 
baltischen Ländern mit. Diese Bemühungen zielen auf die Eindämmung von transnationa­
len Problemen wie Schmuggel, Migration oder organisiertes Verbrechen hin, von denen 
sich Nordeuropa durch die Nachbarschaft zum Baltikum bedroht fühlt.
6. Mit  ihrer  Strategie  zur  Verbesserung  der  ökologischen  Situation  der  Ostsee  unter 
Einbeziehung  aller  Anrainerstaaten  -  die  baltischen  Länder  gelten  hier  als  vorrangige 
Projektländer - möchten die nordischen Staaten ein Modell für die Umweltpolitik der EU 
schaffen. Eine wichtige Rolle in der angestrebten gemeinsamen Umweltpolitik spielt auch 
die Bekämpfung nuklearer Gefahren.
7. Im Laufe der Debatte über die sinnvollste Kooperationsform hat sich herauskristallisiert, 
daß  sowohl  die  baltischen  als  auch  die  nordischen  Länder  einen  eigens  geschaffenen 
"Baltischen Rat" favorisieren, der dann mit dem Nordischen Rat in Kooperation treten 
soll.  Auch  wenn  der  anhaltende  Transformationsprozeß  im  Baltikum  eine  solche 
Kooperation  noch  behindert,  können  die  nordisch-baltischen  Beziehungen  den  jungen 
Republiken auf längere Sicht den Weg nach Europa und somit in eine gesicherte Zukunft 
ebnen.
8. Der  vorliegende  Bericht  propagiert  die  Idee einer  baltisch-nordischen Kooperation  als 
Basis für die Sicherheit  der baltischen Republiken vor den Ansprüchen Rußlands.  Ziel 
dieser Kooperation ist natürliche Integration der Staaten des Baltikums in die europäische 
Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik bei gleichzeitiger Anerkennung und Integration Rußlands 
als europäischer Staat.
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Introduction
For the last five decades the south-eastern and north-western shores of the Baltic Sea 
were separated by the division of Europe. The language of discourse was that of the 
Cold War era and its end has been of historic consequence in many ways. It not only 
helped to end the core aspect of intra-regional conflict between the central authorities in 
Moscow and the Baltic Republics, namely Baltic independence, but also has contributed 
to bridging the gap between the East and the West.
The changes that have taken place can be articulated in a number of different ways. The 
region which once formed a physical as well as mental boundary between the East and 
the  West  is  slowly  opening  up.  This  has  provided  the  long-awaited  opportunity  for 
regional and multi-lateral political, economic and cultural exchange with ”Europe” and 
with the West as a whole. There has been a shift from bi-polarity to multi-polarity as 
well as a decrease of polarization.1 This may imply the decrease of the intensity of global 
problems but it has also created new risks for instability that the former bi-polar world had 
limited.
The geo-political environment in which international relations are taking place is profoundly 
different from the, in historical terms, ”recently expired” Cold War order. Integration, transna­
tionalization, regionalization and a general diffusion of power are the trends of the reigning 
world system. The entrance of the Baltic states into international society, within these terms, 
requires  that  all  will  have  to  adapt  to  these  circumstances.  Aims  and expectations  differ 
because points of departure differ and often dramatically. The concept of independence for the 
Baltic states was an easy thing for the West to agree upon. Now that the situation in the Baltic 
states has progressed beyond this point, and we now discuss modern societies in a modern 
world, or how to fill regained freedom and independence with substance, there is a general 
hesitancy to provide all the support that is needed.
Many western countries, as well-consolidated and internationally integrated states, have had 
difficulty understanding the actions and situation of the Baltic states and occasionally, the 
western community stands far apart in how much they are willing to help. They are critical of 
the actions taken by the Baltic states concerning questions of citizenship and treatment of 
minorities and feel that further integration will require adherence to transnational, universal 
values rather than the exclusivity of the nation-state and its singular interest. It is the common 
opinion of the European community that developments nationally and the decisions made in 
this  crucial  phase of  transition,  are  important  for  the stability and prosperity of  the three 
1 Polarity  is  about  the  number  of  great  powers  in  the  system and  should  not  be  confused  with  polarization  which 
concerns the pattern of fear and hostility among those powers.
countries, but they are also important for the region and for relations with neighbors for years 
to come.
The Nordic countries have a special interest in the development and integration of the Baltic 
states. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism have provided the chance for 
the Nordic countries to contribute to Baltic and regional security. The development of the Bal­
tic states on paths towards democracy and market economy is very important for the collective 
security and stability of the Northern European area. If Sweden and Finland become members 
in the European Union, of which Denmark is already a member, the Baltic states will, in geo­
graphic terms, become a part of Northern Europe’s ”near abroad”. Baltic security will become 
more important for Europe as a whole.
The Baltic states cannot guarantee their security by their own means. The respective states are 
not capable of delivering the necessary means to defend individuals, the society and their terri­
tories. Therefore, weak powers such as the Baltic states have had to adjust their foreign poli­
cies to reflect the realities within the international system of states. The new democracies have 
been pressured domestically to retain their ethnic and national identities while realizing the 
necessity to  adapt  and make concessions  to  the international  community.  In addition,  the 
Baltic states are in the process of building and consolidating their new states. The presence of 
the Russian army (until August 31, 1994 in Estonia and Latvia) and the nationality problems 
also inhibit and put a strain on the transition process the Baltic states are undergoing. These 
problems have highlighted the importance of outside forces in contributing to the security 
situation of the Baltic states.
After more than fifty years of isolation from processes taking place in the West, the Baltic 
states are attempting to integrate themselves with the West and release themselves from Rus­
sian dependence. The Baltic states need national consolidation, they want security guarantees 
and most importantly they want a bulwark from Russia. The Baltic countries are afraid of the 
prospect  of  once again being incorporated  within  a  hegemonic  Russian  (formerly Soviet) 
sphere of influence; in part due to a plethora of statements escalating in 1993 and 1994 from 
Russian officials claiming a special interest in the Baltic states as part of its ”near abroad”. 
They have looked to NATO, as the sole capable supplier of security guarantees within Europe, 
but their requests have been denied. While being sympathetic to Baltic security problems the 
West is more concerned with the successful development of democracy and its principles in 
Russia. The West has also been cautious to accept the Baltic states as full members of West 
European cooperation structures until  the transition process has been completed and these 
states meet the economic and social requirements of the European community. This leaves the 
Baltic states in a precarious position. Unable to provide their own security and not far enough 
along  the  paths  to  democracy  and  stability  to  qualify  for  the  instruments  of  ”European 
security” (through NATO and the European Union), where can the Baltic states turn for help 
and what can they do themselves to provide for their security?
The Baltic states, as small states bordering a great power (Russia), have a limited choice of 
foreign policy options regarding their security. The most obvious options are some form of 
neutrality or an alliance with a great power or powers. The lessons learned during the inter-
war period and the legacy of Soviet  occupation have made the Baltic states wary of their 
powerful  neighbor  Russia.  These  circumstances  lead  them  to  disregard  the  option  of 
neutrality. The Baltic states perceive themselves as a part of Europe and have attempted to 
integrate themselves with Europe militarily, politically and economically for two reasons:
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1. to break the bonds of East European isolation and the old ties which are perceived to limit 
their sovereignty;
2. to create new and close relations with the West.
The problem is that many in Russia perceive the Baltic states as being in their strategic and 
vital interest and refer to the Baltic states as ”the near abroad”. The political instability in 
Russia and the importance for the world of the successful democratization of Russia has 
overshadowed Baltic security issues and has made the West cautious in their acceptance of 
the Baltic states. These circumstances combined with the fact that the Baltic states are at a 
premature  stage  to  be  fully incorporated  into  western  military and political  structures 
leaves them with a security dilemma: How to secure restored independence. Baltic-Nordic 
relations is one probable remedy. This answer poses a number of questions: Why are the 
Nordic countries an option? How can the Nordic countries provide the Baltic states with 
security? What sort of possibilities, regarding the security of the Baltic states, could such a 
relationship  create?  What  are  the  implications  of  Baltic-Nordic  relations  for  Baltic 
security?
The End of the ”Nordic Balance” and its Meaning for Baltic Security
From a systemic perspective, let us consider the present situation in the light of trends in 
the past and of  prospects in the future.  The organizing principle  for security in the 
Baltic Sea region since the end of World War II and until 1989 had been the notion of a 
”Nordic Balance”. This concept was derived from the bi-polar character of the security 
arrangement in this area. As a result of the bi-polarized international system of states, 
all of the countries in this area took on a role within this security arrangement. As a 
result of the East West confrontation, Sweden was forced into neutrality in order to 
keep the Soviet Union from occupying Finland. Sweden has often found itself ”in the eye 
of the cyclone”, watching the smaller countries to the east and west being drawn into 
wars or entering into cooperation with different big powers. Denmark and Norway had 
to become reluctant members of NATO while at the same time refusing to allow the 
stationing of foreign troops and placement of nuclear launching sites on their territories. 
Finland  had  no  option  but  to  sign  a  Pact  of  Friendship,  Cooperation  and  Mutual 
Assistance with the Soviet Union. As Iceland lies midway between the United States and 
Europe, far from the Nordic core area, they were (are) dependent upon U.S. support 
and the Atlantic Alliance was a natural way to go. Thus, we see that in the Baltic Sea 
region the highly polarized environment had geopolitical consequences for these Nordic 
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states,  dividing  them  up  into  half-friends,  neutrals  and  half-foes  of  the  major 
antagonists. The Nordic countries were positioned between the major antagonists who 
did not want to disturb the politically favorable but delicate situation which was vital 
for the control of the North Atlantic.1
The post World War II international order provided predictability in security matters for the 
Nordic countries.  The concept of the ”Nordic Balance” was first  tested after the Finnish-
Soviet ”note crisis” in 1961.2 After the Soviet note requested consultations according to the 
1948 treaty, the Norwegian government hinted that if such consultations were to result in a 
change of Finland’s military situation, the Norwegians would have to reappraise their own 
policy  of  refusing  NATO  bases  in  peacetime.  A  few  days  later  Khrushchev  met  with 
Kekkonen and agreed to postpone the proposed consultation. The joint communique’ stated 
that  ”Kekkonen has  stressed the risk of  ’war  psychosis’  in  the Scandinavian  countries  if 
consultations  were  to  take  place.”3 In a  sense,  this  confirmed  the  notion  that  the  Soviet-
Finnish relationship must be shaped with due regard to repercussions in other parts of the 
Nordic area. This event provides a good example and an implicit understanding of the balance 
of power relationship in the Nordic area. Although it is essentially an acedemic concept and 
was not officially practiced, it  helps us to understand why these countries never made any 
significant changes in their foreign policy orientations during these years.
As a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the velvet revolutions in East and Central Europe 
and  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  concept  of  the  ”Nordic  Balance”  lost  its 
relevancy. ”European security” was given a new meaning for the Nordic states.  The new 
organizing principle of the Baltic Sea region, which has yet to be defined, is characterized by 
integration,  interdependence and regionalization  occuring in  a  considerably less  polarized 
World and European climate. The possibilities for the Nordic countries to contribute to the 
building of European security is fundamentally different than in the past when the East West 
conflict  divided  Europe.  ”When  the  Swedish  Prime  Minister  announced  in  a  famous 
”footnote” to a governmental proposal in October 1990 that Sweden was going to apply for 
membership in the EC, it was a signal of a complete security policy re-orientation not only for 
Sweden but also for Finland.”4 This re-orientation has brought the North closer to Europe and 
vice versa thus making the Baltic states part of Europe’s ”near abroad”.
1 Engberg,  Jan,  "The  Security  of  the  Baltic  Republics  -  A  Matter  of  Attractiveness".  Draft  paper  prepared  for 
presentation at the ISA convention in Acapulco, Mexico, on March 23-27, 1993, p.3.
2 Wahlbäck,  Krister, "The Nordic Region in Twentieth  Century European Politics",  in:  Sundelius,  Bengt (Hg.), 1982, 
Foreign Policies of Northern Europe. Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, p.25.
3 Ibid., p.25.
4 Engberg, op. cit.
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The Nordic countries have taken upon themselves (in varying degrees) the role of supporting 
the Baltic states in their transition to market economies and democratic societies. This role 
was taken on for national security reasons on the part of the Nordic countries as well as for 
historical reasons, cultural ties, and future economic relations. In a speech to the Institute of 
Foreign Affairs  in  Stockholm Sweden on November 17,  1993, Prime Minister  Carl  Bildt 
stated, ”Today, when we see the Baltic people striving for their existence in free states, it is 
occuring in a European context which provides the possibility of security for them and which 
gives us the increased possibility and increased responsibility to contribute to their cause”. 
”The development of the Baltic states is of great importance for the collective security and 
stability in the Northern European area”.1 The increased opportunities and the mutual interest 
for relations across the Baltic Sea have provided the initiative for Baltic-Nordic relations.
Why Baltic-Nordic Relations?
What are some of the advantages and traits of the evolving Baltic-Nordic region? There 
are a number of simple reasons why the Baltic-Nordic project has impetus. First, the 
Baltic-Nordic project is a result of cultural and historical ties as well as one of mutual 
needs  and  gains.  Concerted  work  has  progressed  within  the  framework  of  Nordic 
cooperation to strengthen regional cooperation with the Baltic states.2 While the previous 
rhetoric used to be about exclusion, the current discussions are primarily about inclusion. The 
new patterns of cooperation are occuring not only across borders but in a new direction, from 
East to West and vice-versa. The tighter and more entangled network of economic, political, 
social  and  cultural  relations  in  a  more  open  and  integrated  Europe  are  the  foremost 
instruments for securing peace and stability. The complex economic and political situation in 
Russia poses the main potential source of threat for the Baltic and Nordic states. The policy of 
the Nordic states to weave a tighter cloth between themselves and the Baltic states and Russia 
is therefore an important part of the security policy of the Nordic states.
The second reason is that the future shape and format of Baltic-Nordic cooperation conforms 
to the changing character of Nordic cooperation. Inter-Nordic cooperation will take a different 
form in the future stressing integration and regionalization while not necessarily including all 
of the Nordic countries. Nordic cooperation will be important as a key factor in three are­
nas:Arctic, European and Baltic.3 This regional interaction fits the pattern of the ”Europe of 
the regions” which is progressively becoming more common. As a side-effect of EU deepen­
1 Quote from a speech entitled ”Sverige och De Baltiska Länderna” given by Swedish Prime Minister Carl 
Bildt on November 17, 1993 at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
2 Excerpt from the speech made by Prime Minister of Iceland David Oddsson at the 44th session of the Nordic 
Council of Ministers in Stockholm on March 7, 1994, p.2.
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ing,  patterns  of  sub-regionalization  are  occuring.  The  beginnings  of  these  patterns  are 
developing between the Baltic and Nordic peoples due to their historical and cultural links 
and shared ecological interests. These sub-regional identities are not in opposition to either 
the state or the European level but stress cross-national affinities.
Current Relations
The  foreign  policy  options  of  the  Baltic  states  are  to  a  large  extent  determined  by 
historical  factors  as  much as  by their  geographical  location.  Their  political  roles  as 
nations have been ”labeled” by the thought of  them acting as a bridge between the 
former Soviet Union and the West.1 At the same time, the three Baltic states have chosen 
different strategies in which to build this bridge, resulting in different basic foreign policy 
orientations. Einars Semanis, an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Latvia states, 
”Latvia can act as an economic bridge but strategically this is a naive conception. It will result 
in restricted development and provides restricted possibilities. Latvia could act as a political 
or economic bridge in some circumstances and could profit from it, but Latvia’s place is in 
Western Europe”.2 It is apparent that Nordic-Baltic relations differ in importance for the three 
Baltic  states  due to  geography, culture  and history.  Estonia  being the most  ”Nordic” and 
orienting itself completely towards the West after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Latvia 
being  particularly  oriented  towards  Germany  but  with  ever-increasing  ties  to  Northern 
Europe, and Lithuania being the country most strongly oriented towards East-Central Europe 
and the Baltic state most favorable of acting as a bridge between the West and the East in the 
future.  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania  continue  to  strive  for  independence,  sovereignty, 
economic prosperity and stability but have not agreed between themselves on the best way to 
achieve them. Acting independently, the Baltic states would be competing for economic and 
political help from the West as well as security guarantees to counter-balance the influence 
from their Russian neighbor. However, the Baltic states' expectations of security guarantees 
from the West are in contrast with the ideals of a normalized relationship with Russia. This 
inconsistence with Russian foreign policy in the foreign policies of the Baltic states is made 
evident by Russian claims of having ’vital security interests’ in the Baltic states. As the Baltic 
states came to realize in 1993 and moreso in 1994, mutual cooperation may once again be 
profitable and necessary.
3 Jervell,  Sverre,  "Organizing  Europe’s  Northern  Periphery:The  Nordic  Countries  Facing  The  New Europe".  Paper 
submitted to the conference: The Baltic Sea Region: Conflict or Cooperation. Kiel, December 6-8, 1991, p.8.
1 Hansen, Tina Friis, & Jørgensen, Finn Østergaard, "De Baltiske Lande: På Vej Mod Europa?", in: Politica 25, årg No.4, 
1993, pp.431-441.
2 Interview with Einars Semanis on February 18, 1994 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga Latvia.
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”In their attempt to escape Russian hegemony the Baltic states have turned to the West, to the 
United States, Germany and the Nordic countries as well as to Western international institu­
tions, primarily the EC and NATO.”1 Baltic-Nordic relations take on a special character due to 
the fact that the Nordic countries themselves have taken much of the initative in their rela­
tions  with  the  Baltic  states  as  they also  have  their  interests  at  stake  when attempting  to 
increase  the  security of  the  Baltic  states  and the  Baltic  Sea  region.  These  relations  also 
comply with the implicit ”division of labor” program within the European Union and Europe 
as a whole.2 Developing links with the Nordic countries has been important for the Baltic 
states, primarily during the transition period, when their independence was not internationally 
recognized. Also after independence, Baltic-Nordic relations have been important and cover a 
wide range of issues. Yet, there is a limit  to what Nordic-Baltic cooperation can achieve, 
particularly in  the  field  of  security.  The  Nordic  countries  are  neither  willing  nor  able  to 
undertake general or specific security guarantees towards the Baltic states. On the other hand, 
the Nordic countries have provided the Baltic states with practical support that addresses their 
most urgent security needs.
Provisions and Organization of Nordic Assistance to the Baltic states
The geographical proximity and cultural similarities of the Baltic states and the Nordic 
countries  make cooperation  possible  and  advantageous  in  a  number of  areas.  Since 
these states achieved their independence during the fall of 1991, contact between the 
Nordic countries and the Baltic states has increased to include cooperation among a 
variety of authorities, businesses and organizations. The three Baltic states are in the 
process  of  creating  revitalized  national  structures  and  increasing  their  knowledge 
within  the  political  and  economic  arenas.  Certain  initiatives  have  been  coordinated 
especially for the Baltic states. For example, ”sovereignty support” has been allocated to 
assist the Baltic states in consolidating and retaining their national sovereignty.3 Another 
example are scholarships for Baltic students which are distributed by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers under the administration of the Swedish Institute. Moreover, the initiatives that are 
being undertaken for each of the individual Baltic states are being supplemented by initiatives 
intended for the ”Baltic region” as a whole.4 These initiatives will be outlined below, followed 
1 Petersen, Nicolaj (Hg.), The Baltic states in international politics, Copenhagen 1993, p.56.
2 Western  European  countries  are  sharing  the  task  of  helping  their  Eastern  European  neighbors  in  their 
attempts to form democratically functioning institutions.
3 Utrikesdepartementet,1993, ”Sveriges samarbete med Central- och Östeuropa”. ”Sovereignty support” is the 
title of the program referring to the political and practical support provided to the Baltic states.
4 Ibid., p.50.
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by bi-lateral cooperation between the Baltic states and the Nordic countries.
In this segment of the essay, public economic, political, military and environmental assistance 
from the Nordic countries to the Baltic states will be addressed within the context of its rele­
vance for influencing the stability, development and security of the individual Baltic states. 
The programs chosen are those which most directly affect the political, economic, military 
and environmental security and stability of the Baltic states.
Economic Assistance
On November 11, 1991 a ministerial meeting in the G 24 was held in Brussels. At that 
meeting the three Baltic countries were accepted as recipient countries under the G 24 
scheme. This meeting was followed by a more technical meeting on December 11, 1991 
dealing with the Baltic countries in particular.  The Center for Cooperation with the 
European  Economies  in  Transition  under  the  auspices  of  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  convened  a  special  meeting  on 
November  18,  1991  concerning  the  situation  in  the  three  Baltic  countries  and  the 
identification of the specific needs of these countries. At these meetings, international 
organizations  such  as  the  IMF,  IBRD,  EBRD,  BIS  and  NIB  were  also  invited  and 
reported  on  their  analyses  and  possible  areas  of  assistance.  The  knowledge  of  the 
economic situations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania increased considerably on the gov­
ernment level of the industrialized countries during the Spring of 1992. Moreover, it has 
become possible to learn about the priorities of the Baltic states regarding their needs 
for assistance. ”During the various meetings, the Nordic countries have demonstrated a 
very active profile concerning the Baltic states and it is generally recognized, and even 
expected,  by  the  international  community  that  the  Nordic  countries  should  play  an 
active role in helping the Baltic countries in the transition towards a market economy.”1 
Thus, the all-European distribution of labor policy favored by the European Union is relative 
in the case of the Nordic and the Baltic states.
1 The Nordic  Council  of Ministers,  Ministers  of Finance and  Economics.  Quoted  from the report,  Baltic  Investment 
Program, Nordic Baltic Investment Committee, March 3, 1992. Nordic assistance to promote investments in small and 
medium-sized  enterprises  in  the  Baltic  countries,  agenda  6  "International  cooperation  on  assistance  to  the  Baltic 
countries", p.20.
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The Baltic Investment Program
Contribution Agreement
Whereas:
The governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of  
Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Sweden (the Nordic countries) want  
to  contribute  to  the  development  of  a  market  economic  system in  Estonia,  Latvia  and  
Lithuania (the Baltic countries). In this respect the Nordic countries agree with the Baltic  
countries that the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in the privat sector  
is  an  important  factor  in  the  transformation  process,  and  for  economic  growth  and 
prosperity.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has been established by 
agreement among its members (the EBRD agreement) to foster the transition of Central  
and  Eastern  European  countries  towards  open-market  oriented  economies  and  the  
promotion of private and entrepreneurial initiative.
In order to assist the Baltic countries, the Nordic countries have adopted a five-point Baltic  
Investment  Program to  be operative  during the period  1992-1 July  1995 to  encourage  
investment  in  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  in  the  private  sector.  The  Program 
consists of three Funds for technical assistance and two Funds for investment.1
The Baltic Investment Program consists of the five following elements:
1. Full-scale technical assistance to the three national Baltic investment banks. A 5 million 
Ecu Fund is established. The purpose being that these banks should play a central role as 
financial intermediaries in matters relating to investments in the three countries.
2. Technical assistance for pre-feasibility and feasibility studies of investment projects. A 5 
million Ecu Fund is established. The purpose being to make Nordic enterprises interested 
in investing or entering into joint ventures in the Baltic countries.
3. Technical assistance for the identification and preparation of investment and privatization. 
A 5 million  Ecu Fund is  established.  The purpose being to  attract  Nordic  as  well  as 
international capital to investment projects in the Baltic countries.
4. Project  Investment  Fund with the Nordic Investment  Bank. A 30 million Ecu Fund is 
established. The purpose being for the Baltic countries to benefit from the Nordic Invest­
ment Bank’s (NIB) close contact to Nordic enterprises which are able to carry out invest­
1 Ibid., pp.21-55.
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ment projects which are particularly interesting to the Baltic countries.
5. Fund for risk capital, loans and guarantees attached to the European Bank for Reconstruc­
tion and Development for the purpose of supplementing the operations through co-financ­
ing, lending and investment operations undertaken by the EBRD and other international 
sources. A 30 million Ecu Fund is established, making another approximately 30 million 
Ecu available through co-financing. The purpose being to make international capital avail­
able to the Baltic countries.1
”Nordic” support to the Baltic states is also supplemented with bi-lateral efforts from the indi­
vidual Nordic countries.  The extent  and form of aid varies with the respective Nordic 
country but  in  all  cases  the  goal  is  to  implement  market  economic  reforms.  Iceland 
provides monetary support to the Baltic states distributed for a large part by the Nordic 
Investment Bank. Danish aid plans allocate two billion DKK per year for both bilateral 
and multilateral activities. Aid to the Baltic area and the St.Petersburg region amount to 
550  million  DKK  and  focus  primarily  on  industrial  investments  and  export  credits.2 
During 1990-1993, Finland has provided economic assistance valued at 818 million FIM 
directed  mainly  towards  agriculture,  infrastructure,  technical  assistance  and  financial 
support in its neighboring areas of Estonia, Kola and Karelia.3 Norway’s economic aid to 
East  and Central  Europe is  directed mainly to  Northwest Russia,  the Baltic  states and 
Poland totalling 337 million NEK in 1992. Sweden has been the major contributor of the 
Nordic  countries  to  the  Baltic  states  and  Eastern  Europe.  In  1990,  the  Swedish 
government approved an aid budget until the fiscal year 1993 of one billion SEK to be 
distributed in a number of forms: economic, environmental and political.4 The success of 
these programs will ultimately depend upon their effective distribution and applicability to 
future needs.
Transforming the command economy into a market-oriented system requires a determined 
effort on the part of the Baltic countries as well as extensive assistance from the industrialized 
countries. A sound macro-economic policy and an appropriate legislative framework are a 
precondition  for  attracting capital  to  the investments  needed for  the  required and desired 
change in the structure of the economy to be implemented.5 Establishing a sound legislative 
framework is just the beginning. Underlying every market economy are three basic points 
1 Ibid., pp.21-55.
2 Dellenbrant,  Jan  Åke,  'The  Baltic  Connection:  Nordic  Relations  with  the  Eastern  Baltic  Sea  Region  in  an  EC 
Perspective',  in Cerum, Umeå University, 1992, p.31.
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 'Action Plan for the Government of Finland for the Baltic countries', 1993, p.1.
4 Dellenbrant, op. cit., p.32.
5 Nordic Council of Ministers, op. cit., p.21.
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which lie  at  the core of any viable Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure (LRI): security of 
private property; enforcement of contracts; and assignment of liability for wrongful damage. 
To achieve sustained economic development, governments must be sufficiently powerful to 
implement legal and regulatory infrastructures but must also be limited and restrained by the 
judiciary so that individual rights are not abrogated. It remains to be seen if the governments 
of  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania  will  be  able  to  effectively  establish  and  enforce  an 
infrastructure which will serve the collective interest. This is not only their goal but the goal 
of the Nordic countries and will serve as a catalyst for more encompassing integration in the 
future.
Closer economic relations, which the free-trade agreements between the Baltic states and the 
Nordic countries are the foremost symbol for, will be developed further by increasingly inte­
grated political relations. The cooperation between the Nordic countries and the Baltic states 
could be compared to those between the EU and the Central European states. In both cases, 
the  aim  is  to  lead  and  help  the  Central  European  and  Baltic  states  in  reaching  their 
pronounced goal of EU-membership.
Political and limited Military Assistance
It has been approximately two and one half years since the Baltic states achieved their 
independence (fall of 1991). During this short period of time, the general atmosphere in 
the Baltic states has changed from one of exultation and hope to worry and insecurity. 
This change in attitude is mainly the result of two external factors. The first being the 
success of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Russian nationalists which supported 
this party in the Russian parliamentary elections on December 12, 1993. The second 
being the lack of interest that the West has shown to provide security guarantees to the 
Baltic states.
The election results and various statements from the Russian government have justified 
worries  of  Russian  imperialism  in  the  Baltic  states.  The  Latvian  government  and 
members of the Saeima stated in a proposal to the Baltic Assembly on January 31, 1994 
that ”these statements indicate a profound shift in Russia’s policy toward the Baltic 
states, ominous to their future independence”. The proposal called for an international 
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high-level conference to bring ”the threatening situation to the attention of the world”.1 
Fear  in  the  Baltic  states  has  caused  them  to  press  the  West  even  harder  for  security 
guarantees. The Baltic states had hoped, as did the Visegrad nations, that they would be given 
the chance to become full members in NATO after the NATO summit which was held in 
Brussels on January 12, 1994. Instead, they were offered a somewhat weaker agreement with 
NATO,  entitled  the  ”Partnership  for  Peace  (PFP)”,  which  is  intended  to  strengthen  ties 
between the Atlantic alliance and former Warsaw Pact members without extending NATO 
security guarantees. The PFP is based upon cooperation through which the forces of the Baltic 
states  have  the  opportunity  to  conduct  training  exercises  and  take  part  in  peace-keeping 
operations with NATO’s military forces. Although the PFP implies the possibility for the 
Baltic states to increase its activities with NATO and build competence within the individual 
Baltic states ranks, it does not provide the badly needed practical aid, such as uniforms and 
equipment,  which  are  needed  to.perform  such  training  exercises.  The  PFP  also  lacks  a 
political dimension that the Nordic countries provide through mediating between the Baltic 
states  and  Russia  concerning  Russian  troop  withdrawal,  helping  to  prevent  territorial 
violations and the nationality problems within each Baltic state. These are the goals of the 
Nordic countries’ initiative to ”support the sovereignty” of the Baltic states.
The ”Support of Sovereignty”
The Nordic countries as well as various West-European countries have committed their 
support to assist the Baltic states in consolidating and retaining their respective national 
independence.  The  Nordic  countries  have  provided  the  Baltic  states  with  energetic 
support both during their strive for international recognition as independent states and 
in  their  efforts  to  secure  an  agreement  with  Russia  for  the  final  withdrawal  of  all 
Russian troops from their individual territories.2 The withdrawal of the Russian troops 
from Estonia and Latvia was the main topic of discussion along with a discussion of the rights 
of  the  Russian  minorities  within  the  Baltic  states,  when  the  Nordic  and  Baltic  foreign 
1 Proposal to The Baltic Assembly from the Latvian government and members of the Saeima on January 31, 
1994  regarding  a  conference  of  the  North  Atlantic  Alliance  Baltic  Security  Seminar.  The  proposed 
conference scheduled for September 1994 will not be a government one with official delegations, although 
governmental representatives will be asked to come as observers. It will have present leading authorities on 
international security,  members of prestigious western research and policy support institutions, and select 
commentators of the most important publications. The Baltic Assembly would act as one of the sponsors. The 
other co-sponsor could be the Nordic Council.
2 The Latvian Foreign Minister  Georgs  Andrejevs was invited to Stockholm on February 8,  1994 to meet 
Swedish Prime Minister Carl  Bildt  and Swedish Foreign Minister  Margaretha af Ugglas and discuss the 
necessity of signing a formal agreement with Russia,  one which would receive international recognition, 
concerning  the  withdrawal  of  Russian  troops  from Latvia.  The  Swedish  government  also  promised  to 
participate in an eventual international observation group for this purpose.
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ministers met for their first formal meeting in September 1993 in Visby, Sweden. ”We see the 
meeting here in Visby as an important step towards increased cooperation with the Nordic 
countries”, said then Foreign Minister of Estonia Trivimi Velliste.1 These topics were once 
again given top priority at the Nordic Council of Ministers meeting in Stockholm Sweden on 
March 7, 1994 at which the Prime Ministers of the three Baltic states were the highest ranked 
guests.
Bilateral cooperation from the Nordic countries in the form of sovereignty support is in pro­
gress but the extent of support varies depending on the government in office in the respective 
Nordic country as well as the historical foreign/security policy position of each country. Den­
mark, along with giving political support, has a limited defense agreement with Latvia provid­
ing for education of the military, general equipment and advice concerning the preparation of 
the presentation documents for the Partnership for Peace Program.2 This agreement is limited 
but, as Denmark is a member of NATO, this agreement provides Latvia with an implicit link 
to a NATO country, and therefore has an international significance. Iceland and Finland have 
maintained a lower profile concerning security related contributions than the other Nordic 
countries but in meetings of the Nordic Council have supported the policies of the other Nor­
dic countries.3
Sweden and Norway are the most active of the Nordic countries regarding their support of the 
independence of the respective Baltic states. Since the beginning of 1994, Norway has shown 
greater interest in supporting the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Norwegian 
government has granted 40 million Norwegian crowns (approximately 6 million dollars) for 
the eventual building of housing for the Russian officers leaving Latvia and Estonia.  The 
government also stresses the importance of keeping close contact with the other Nordic coun­
tries concerning the troop withdrawal.4 Sweden’s ”support of sovereignty” program, which 
was introduced in December of 1991, has comprised 30 different projects constituting an allo­
cation of eight million dollars and is helping the Baltic states to create a stable environment in 
which democratic institutions and a functioning market economy can exist.
The Swedish government led by Carl Bildt has been especially active and outspoken in their 
attempts to make it clear to both the Baltic states and Russia that Sweden, ”could reject auto­
1 Dagens Nyheter, ’Möte om Rysk reträtt ur Estland’, September 10, 1993.
2 Interview with Guntars Kukuls, International Political Organization Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic  of  Latvia.  The  format for  initiating the Partnership for  Peace  program consists  of  3  stages  or 
documents. Latvia is currently working on the second document which is the proposals for the presentation 
document to the NACC.
3 Oddson, op. cit., p.4.
4 Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Comments made by Foreign Minister of Norway Bjørn Tore Godal to a 
meeting of the parliament(Stortinget) on December 8, 1993.
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matic Swedish neutrality if the sovereignty of the Baltic states were threatened”. This quote 
from the speech made by Carl  Bildt  to  the  Institute  of  Foreign Affairs  in  Stockholm on 
November 17, 1993 was given much praise by Estonia’s Foreign Minister Juri Luik. Minister 
Luik stated that the Swedish government is a ”model leading actor in the mission of the Bal­
tics,  which (Sweden) had dared to  act  where the international  community had not”.1 Carl 
Bildt’s recommendation, from this same speech, that Sweden was to act ”non-belligerent” in 
the case that the Baltic states were attacked, is clearly a sign of support from the Swedish 
government. Prime Minister Bildt,  in his attempts to internationalize the troop withdrawal 
issue, has made a number of trips to the United States, the Baltic states and Russia. He has 
taken on the position as mediator concerning this issue and convinced all of the involved part­
ners of the importance of a timely withdrawal. Sweden has promised to contribute 2 million 
dollars to facilitate the carry-through of the Latvian-Russian agreement.2
The support of sovereignty programs of Norway and Sweden have also addressed the acute 
needs  of  the  Baltic  states  in  attempting  to  reduce  the  internal  insecurity of  these  states. 
Sweden and Norway, through multi-lateral and bi-lateral cooperation with the Baltic states, 
have sought to reduce Nordic and Baltic vulnerabilities to threats regarding organized crime. 
These problems have become transnational affecting the security of all the Baltic Sea states. 
This in turn has made the Baltic Sea states dependent upon one another. As stated earlier, 
states  can  seek  to  reduce  their  insecurity  either  by  reducing  their  vulnerability  or  by 
preventing or lessening threats.3 These alternatives underlie, respectively, the ideas of national 
and international security.4 In other words, national security policy can either focus inward, 
seeking to reduce the vulnerabilities of the state itself (which is the policy of the Baltic states 
in  this  case),  or  outward,  seeking to  reduce external  threat by addressing its  sources (the 
policy of the Nordic countries in this case).
Baltic Efforts
The Prime Ministers of the Baltic states, in attempting to establish better cooperation 
between their states, reached an agreement concerning the objectives of cooperation and 
concrete measures to be taken. This was accomplished on January 19, 1994 in Jurmala, 
Latvia.  Among the various fields mentioned for cooperation were State Borders and 
1 Baltiska stater jagar västs stöd, in: Dagens Nyheter, March 3, 1994.
2 Rysk truppreträtt ur Lettland, in: Dagens Nyheter, May 2, 1994.
3 Kjell Goldman, Det Internationella Systemet, Stockholm 1978, p.64, quoted in Bengt Sundelius, Coping with Structural 
security threats, in: Otmar Höll (Hg.), Small States in Europe and Independence, Vienna 1983, p.298.
4 Ibid., p.112.
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Customs. The objective was to solve the problems concerned with strengthening control 
on the Eastern border in order to put a stop to the criminal activities which transpire 
across the state borders.1 Presently, the Baltic states are not able to satisfactorily control 
their respective borders and, moreover, lack the funds to do so.
The Baltic states have made efforts to build defense structures to combat the threats to their 
territory and to maintain their physical borders. A conscript system with 18 months of service 
is  to be the basis  of the defense forces in all  three Baltic countries.  The distribution and 
number of troops is as follows:
Distribution of Defense Forces in the Baltic Republics
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
91/92 goal 91/92 goal 91/92 goal
Regular Army 1.000 3.500 3.000 9.000 8.000 15.000
Border Guards 2.000 7-8.000 2.500 9.000 7.000 15.900
Home Guard - - 10-12.000 20.000 12.500 30.000
Source: (Vares 1993), (RFE/RL no 49 1992), (Gricius 1992), (Knudsen 1993)2.
These figures reflect a limited capacity, on the part of the Baltic states, to defend their respec­
tive countries against foreign aggression. Weak powers such as the Baltic states will not be 
able to defend themselves against an aggressive Russian attack, at least not for the time being. 
Therefore, Baltic security strategy should not be based upon defending themselves against a 
1 Birkavs, op. cit.
2 Engberg, Jan, op.cit., p.6. Most recent figures from Hansen, Tina Friis, & Jørgensen, Finn Østergaard, op. cit., p.437.
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Russian attack. What is more important in the case of the Baltic states is to first insure their 
internal security and only after stability has been achieved, invest their scant resources in a 
more  powerful  and  all-incompassing  defense  to  defend  their  territories  against  external 
threats.  Estonian  President  Lennart  Meri  said  on  February  24,  1994  that  it  was  ”a 
misjudgement” for Estonia to put its scant resources into building the army, while failing to 
properly  develop  the  border  guard.1 Lithuanian  President  Algirdas  Brazauskas  stated  his 
opinion about what he thought was needed in the case of Lithuania. ”We are interested in 
having  a  structure,  modelled  after  analogous  European  structures,  that  would  be  able  to 
guarantee border security, would be granted broad powers in migration, customs and other 
areas,  and would  integrate  the  several  agencies  that  now function  inefficiently and in  an 
uncoordinated manner.”2 This is where the Nordic countries can contribute to the security of 
the Baltic states.
The Nordic countries through general support and, the more extensive ”sovereignty support” 
in the cases of Sweden and Norway, have directed their support where it is needed most. Swe­
den has  provided  the  Baltic  states  with  patrol  boats,  vehicles,  general  supplies,  essential 
police equipment, and education of their military for border patrolling and toll assignments. 
More specifically, the Estonian government has received equipment from the Swedish police 
which make it possible to check the authenticity of passports while Latvian police forces have 
received metal detectors for security controll at the Riga International Airport and at other 
borders. A new rescue service has been established in Estonia which provides education to its 
trainees and receives a great deal of material and protection equipment from the Swedish gov­
ernment. Similiar projects have also been introduced in Latvia and Lithuania. Norway con­
tributed a patrol boat (Storm-Class) to each Baltic state on February 11, 1994.3 Aiding the 
Baltic states in constructing an effectively functioning border and customs control will reduce 
the vulnerabilities  to  the Baltic  states and prevent  these threats  from reaching the Nordic 
countries. The Baltic states have also been given support for the development of competence 
in:  the  forming of  legislation  concerning  security matters;  the  edifying of  a  civil  aircraft 
warning service, and civil and military defense.4
One area in which the Baltic states have been disappointed with the Nordic countries and 
other  states  is  regarding  their  denied  requests  for  weapons  for  their  defense.  Krister 
Wahlbäck, a security advisor to Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, states, ”Issues of allowing 
1 Tammerk, Tarmu, "Crime Threatens  Estonia with 'Dual Power' Society", The Baltic Independent, March 4-10, 1994, 
vol 4, no 202, p.1.
2 Brazauskas, op. cit.
3 Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Press Release of February 11, 1994, p.35.
4 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993, Sweden’s cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe.
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exports of weapons to other countries are dealt with according to Swedish law, which in this 
area, is rather complicated. These issues are also politically rather sensitive. The improvement 
of Baltic-Russian relations is a necessary first requirement.”1 To quote Einars Semanis again 
concerning this issue, ”There are a lack of resources and lack of expertice. In this area a lot of 
help is coming from the Nordic states. Security in my understanding includes also social and 
economic questions. In economic and social terms, the intention to build the army, border 
guards,customs, mobile divisions, land guards and strong police is extremely important for 
developing order in the state.”2 A properly functioning defense and border guard needs a solid 
structural base to begin with, which can later be supplemented with weapons.
The security of a state does not depend solely on external factors and the establishment of 
credible armed forces. It also depends on a number of internal factors not always or explicitly 
related to the traditional concept of national security. In the case of the Baltic states, who are 
still in the process of consolidating their regained independent statehood under difficult exter­
nal  as  well  as  internal  circumstances,  the  aformentioned  factors  may be  as  important  as 
external aspects.
Environmental Assistance
It is both in the interest of the Nordic countries as well as the Baltic states to improve 
the  environmental  conditions  in  the  Baltic  Sea  area.  It  has  been  suggested  by  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  within  Riksdagen  (the  Swedish  Parliament)  that  the 
Nordic countries agree to assign each country in the Baltic  Sea region as a priority 
project-country.3 On September  28,  1993 the Ministers  of Environment  from the Nordic 
countries  met  and discussed a Nordic  environmental  strategy for the years 1994-95.4 The 
strategy contains  proposals  for  certain  measures  which  will  be  prioritized  in  the  Nordic 
countries and in their nearby surroundings. With this strategy, the Nordic countries aim to 
serve as a model for international environmental cooperation for the European Union (EU). 
This strategy will also serve as a basis for increased Nordic environmental cooperation which 
is  expected  to  lead  to  a  strengthening  of  resources  for  use  in  the  environmental  sector. 
Increased cooperation was in fact a priority of the Nordic Council session held in Mariehamn 
1 Personal Interview with Krister Wahlbäck at the University of Umeå, Sweden on March 23, 1994. A similar opinion 
was expressed in an interview with Inger Durant, First Secretary of the Embassy of Denmark in Riga, Latvia 
on February 16, 1994.
2 Personal Interview with Einars Semanis at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga Latvia on February 14, 1994.
3 Official foreign policy proposals entitled Utrikesutskottets betänkande, published by the Swedish Parliament for fiscal  
year 1993-1994, Volume 9, paragraph 6 "Nordisk samarbete".
4 Ibid., p.10.
Baltic-Nordic Relations§ 24
in November 1993.
The  environmental  conditions  in  the  Baltic  Sea  area  require  an  enormous  financial 
investment. The Nordic countries contribute 900 million Swedish crowns (approximately 115 
million U.S. dollars) yearly with technical and economic cooperation through a number of 
sources.  The Helsinki  Commission  (HELCOM) established in  1990,  whose purpose is  to 
retain the economic balance in the Baltic Sea, is an action group comprising representatives 
from all of the Baltic Sea states as well as Norway, at that time Czechoslovakia and the EU. 
The group mapped out forty acute ”hot spots” to be taken care of within the Baltic Sea region 
during  the  first  five  years.  The  total  cost  for  the  program which  will  extend  over  many 
decades and sixty more projects is approximately twenty billion dollars.1 A second source for 
financial  environmental  aid  is  the  Preparation  for  International  Technical-Economic 
Cooperation (BITS) which is a Swedish governmental organization, intended to complement 
the work of HELCOM, that receives money for technical assistance. The largest initiatives by 
BITS and its related institutions have been intended for research and project development of 
purifying  plants  as  well  as  specific  environmental  problems,  the  enforcement  of  new 
legislation in this  area, education,  etc. Another source of Nordic investment  is the Nordic 
Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) whose goal is to promote investments which are 
of  Nordic  environmental  interest  by financing companies  in  Central  and  Eastern Europe. 
NEFCO can increase the possibilities for the East and Central European countries to build up 
their  own production  capacity of  environmental  equipment  through loans  and guarantees 
financed by joint ventures.
Problems with nuclear security and radiation protection in the Baltic states are not only dan­
gerous for the respective populations of the Baltic states but are security risks for all of the 
states within their vicinity. Ever since the Chernobyl accident, international awareness has in­
creased and the security level of such nuclear reactors has been questioned. At the request of 
Estonia’s environmental authorities, international deliberations took place in Stockholm at the 
radiation protection institute  (SSI) on January 25, 1994. In Paldiski Estonia there are two 
nuclear reactors which have not been used for twenty years and which contain highly radioac­
tive fuel.  Experts from Sweden, Finland, Estonia, the United States, Russia, the European 
Union and the International  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have met  to discuss how the 
radioactive waste in Paldiski is to be disposed of. The Paldiski project is just one of the many 
radiation protection programs which Sweden in cooperation with Finland and Norway, among 
others, have worked together on with Estonia.
The Nordic countries also act individually on environmental  issues in the Baltic Sea area 
1 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p.32.
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through  bilateral  initiatives  and a  division  of  projects.  These  various  projects  have  been 
divided according to national interest and the merit of each project. Geographical proximity 
plays a large role as well as cultural and historical ties for deciding which issues and areas to 
prioritize. Sweden, for example, has taken a special interest in two reactors (Chernobyl type) 
which are situated closest to Sweden in Ignalina, Lithuania. These two reactors play a vital 
role in the region by supplying energy to Lithuania, Belorussia and Latvia and are forecasted 
to  be  necessary  for  the  survival  of  this  area  in  the  foreseeable  future.  Thus,  Swedish 
contributions to nuclear security in Central and Eastern Europe, made through SKI and SSI, 
have mainly gone towards security improvements at Ignalina.1 Finnish initiatives, on the other 
hand, have mainly been concentrated in Estonia. Two of the current projects which are only a 
part of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear legacy are a gigantic dam with radioactive waste in 
Sillamäe and cement cassings filled with 100 tons of concentrated radioactive waste in Saku, 
south of Tallinn.2 The Russian military had stated at an earlier date that they would take care 
of the dismantling of the nuclear reactors. ”It is now evident that the Russians cannot take 
care  of  the  dismantling  and  waste  management  in  Estonia  without  support  from  other 
countries. They need economic help and aid from radiation specialists”, said SSI’s deputy 
chief Jan Olof Snihs.3
Environmental security problems of this sort are a good example of one of the areas in which 
interdependence clearly is present between the Nordic countries and the Baltic states. Nuclear 
security issues clearly have no borders and it is in the national interest of all of the states 
within this region to solve such potentially harmful problems. The Barents Region initiative, 
introduced  officially  in  January  of  1993,  is  another  example  of  formal  international 
cooperation aiming to work out many security problems that, although having their origin in 
one  country,  directly influence  the  security  of  other  nations.  Other  issues,  such  as  those 
concerning the minority rights of the Sami in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia and the 
Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic states, are transnational. Although each state has its 
own national policy concerning the minority question, the issue becomes one of international 
focus due to its character. Such issues also often require outside input in order to provide an 
objective viewpoint for solutions. This has been the primary goal of the CSCE missions in the 
Baltic  states.  The  long-term  Mission  of  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe (CSCE) was opened in Riga on November 19, 1993 with the purpose to confront the 
difficult challenges the country faces in re-assuming its place in the ranks of free, democratic 
1 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p.34, 35. SKI when translated to English means The States Nuclear 
Inspection while SSI stands for The Radiation Protection Institute both of which are Swedish governmental 
institutions.
2 Baltikum ska få hjälp sanera strålrisker, in: Dagens Nyheter, January 26, 1994.
3 Ibid.
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and fully sovereign nations.1 The presence and cooperation of an international organization 
such as this makes all of the partners in the negotiation process realize that the issue is not 
just of national importance but is important for the European community as a whole.
Proposals for Baltic-Nordic Cooperation
With the realization of independence for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, there followed 
a  debate  in  the  Nordic  countries  concerning  the  future  format  for  Nordic-Baltic 
cooperation.  As  could  be  expected,  the  reactions  varied  from  country  to  country 
depending  on  the  respective  country’s  cultural,  economic,  political  and  security 
orientations.  There  have  been  suggestions  by  some,  such  as  the  foreign  minister  of 
Denmark, that the Baltic states be admitted to the Nordic Council. Others have stated 
quite  a  different  opinion  regarding  the  format  of  cooperation  between  the  Nordic 
Council  and the Baltic  states.  Anker Jørgensen,  former Danish prime minister  and the 
present chairman of the Nordic Council, took a negative stance toward this proposition. There 
are three distinctly different suggestions for how to organize the format for Nordic relations 
with the Baltic states:
1. Enlarging the Nordic Council to include the three Baltic republics.
2. Cooperation between the Nordic Council and the three republics grouped together in a 
"Baltic Council", i.e. a "council-to-council" model.
3. wider Baltic council for everyone around the Baltic Sea, from Kiel to St. Petersburg.2 
Arguments  for  model  2  and against  model  1  have been heard from various  members  of 
Nordic governments as well as an argument from the secretariat of the Nordic Council of 
Ministers.  The  resistance  to  enlarging  the  Nordic  Council  can  be  summarized  in  the 
following three arguments:
a) Similar  to  the  case  of  EC  enlargement:  widening  implies  less  deepening  or  even  a 
watering down of existing cooperation.  i.e.taking on board new members  and thereby 
increasing differences in the club will mean a less efficient instrument of cooperation for 
the old members.
b) The Nordic Council in the coming years will increasingly be about EU integration, about 
negotiating, adapting to and possibly influencing decisions and integration into the Euro­
pean Union. Differences in distance to the EU core are already substantial within the Nor­
1 CSCE Mission in Latvia, op. cit.
2 Waever, Ole, "The Baltic Sea Region - Does it Exist?", in Kukk, Mare & Jervell, Sverre & Joenniemi, Peter (Hg.), The 
Baltic Sea Area - A Region in the Making, Vardings: Sarpsborg, Finland 1992, pp.26-38.
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dic group although this distance may become much shorter after the Swedish, Finnish and 
Norwegian referendums in October and November of 1994. The Baltic republics are even 
further from membership than Norway and will for a long time have completely different 
types of problems in relation to the EU than the Nordic countries. Therefore, a Nordic 
council  with the Baltic  republics  as  members  will  not  be in  a very good position  for 
fullfilling its main function of the 1990s: EU-relations.1
c) Some Nordic politicians are afraid that if the Baltic republics are not incorporated in a 
Baltic  Council,  the  Nordic  Council  will  end  up  as  a  conflict  solver  for  inter-Baltic 
conflicts.
The Baltic states themselves have decided that cooperation with the Nordic Council, within 
the  guidelines  of  a  Baltic  Council,  would  be  the  most  effective  format.  At  the  44:th 
session of the Nordic Council of Ministers on March 7, 1994 in Stockholm Sweden, the 
leaders  of  the  respective  Nordic  governments  gave their  mutual  support  to  the  Baltic 
states. At this session, attended by the Baltic states' three Prime Ministers, Estonia’s Mart 
Laar, Latvia’s Valdis Birkavs and Lithuania’s Adolfas Slezevicius, Valdis Birkavs stated 
that, ”it seems that currently the necessity to create the institution of cooperation between 
the executive powers, the Baltic Council  of Ministers, is not under doubt. Taking into 
consideration that the Nordic countries cooperate in the same way and their cooperation 
has a rich history, we have an opportunity to listen to the thoughts of the representatives 
from the Nordic countries.  I believe that this  seminar will  provide some contributions 
when  establishing  the  institution  of  the  Baltic  Council  of  Ministers  and  further 
cooperation  between  the  Nordic  and  the  Baltic  states”.2 The  Baltic  Council  as  a 
conditional  roof  structure  would  insure  the  continuity  of  the  process  of  mutual 
cooperation,  basing  its  activities  on  the  Baltic  Assembly  and  the  Baltic  Council  of 
Ministers. The meetings of the Presidents, Prime Ministers and Governments would take 
place  within  the  framework  of  the  Baltic  Council.  This  kind  of  council-to-council 
cooperation  will  then create  a  kind of  loop where the  structures  of  both  councils  are 
strengthened by this cooperation instead of being undermined as in the case of a larger 
Nordic council.3
It should be noted that models 2 and 3 actually are compatible: cooperation between the Nor­
dic Council and the Baltic republics can be nested inside a wider Baltic Sea Council.
1 Jervell, Sverre, "Elementer i en Ny Nordisk Arkitektur", in Jervell, Sverre (Hg.) Norden i det Nye Europa. Oslo: The 
Nordic Foreign Policy Institute, 1991, p.185-222.
2 Birkavs, op. cit., p.7.
3 Ibid.
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The lack of a concrete political  strategy for the future within the respective Baltic  states, 
which is necessary to carry out the much needed political and judicial reforms, hinders inter-
Baltic cooperation and the three Baltic  states both politically and economically.  This is  a 
product  of  the  transition  process  which  all  three  states  are  still  undergoing.  More  stable 
societies could create an attractive business environment which in turn would attract foreign 
business  investment.  However,  Nordic-Baltic  relations,  if  provided  with  a  legally-based 
structure  and  a  functioning  Baltic  Council,  may  provide  the  route  into  Europe  and  the 
increased political ties for the Baltic states which could lead to a more secure future.
The  aforementioned  issues  highlight  the  major  problems  and  opportunities  of  the  Baltic 
states. In summary of the arguments made in this paper, the following model outlines ”The 
Baltic Security Dilemma” and a possible solution:
”The Baltic Security Dilemma”
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As weak powers  undergoing transition,  the Baltic  states  have a  limited  choice of  foreign 
policy options regarding their security. The most obvious options are some form of neutrality 
or an alliance with a great power or powers in some form. The option of neutrality has been 
disregarded due to the lessons learned from the past and the current indecision within Russia 
concerning its future role in the Baltic states. The Baltic states perceive themselves as a part 
of the "new Europe".  They have attempted  to use European integration in various forms, 
militarily, politically and economically, as a form of security. Europe and the West as a whole 
have been cautious to extend these instruments of integration while the Baltic states are in a 
stage of transition. The transition process inherently implies instability due to the fluidity of 
the situation. It can be positive, by creating the possibility for new arrangements, but also 
negative  in  that  the  direction  of  change  may  not  be  that  which  is  strived  after.  Some 
proponents of European integration feel that it can be dangerous to wait, and want to include 
the Baltic states and other nations as soon as possible, while the majority of countries in the 
West have adopted the ”wait and see” point of view. If the transition process fails, this can 
imply a whole number of possible outcomes, none of them positive for the Baltic states or the 
international community. Success on the other hand could lead to achieving economic and 
political development. The Nordic countries have contributed their support to seeing that the 
transition  process  does  succeed  and  lead  to  these  developments.  As  democratically 
functioning,  stable  societies,  the  Baltic  states  will  have  met  the  requirements  for  further 
integration  and  possible  future  membership  in  the  two  most  important  instruments  for 
European expansion, the EU and NATO. This is the common goal of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, one which would provide the Baltic states with the security they desire in today's 
Europe.
Conclusion
In the old days,  weak powers were either occupied,  conquered or included in  more 
powerful states' "spheres of interest". The case of the Baltic countries illustrates that 
national  security  is  more and more dependent upon international  and transnational 
circumstances. The networks of international organizations, regional communities and 
interstate  cooperation  have  increased  tremendously  over  the  past  few  years.  This 
development may very well become the most important aspect of Baltic security. Both 
international  anarchy  and  national  security  are  increasingly  becoming  relative 
phenomena, thus creating an order where national prosperity and security depend on 
participation  in  international  cooperation  rather  than  on  military  arrangements. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are already involved in this process of "international net­
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working" but they have not developed the legal and regulatory infrastructure for actors 
on the state and other levels to participate effectively. As argued in this essay, the Nordic 
countries can influence the security situation for the Baltic  states,  by preparing and 
aiding the Baltic states in taking this process further. The Nordic countries and the EU 
are  the  forerunners  of  various  aspects  of  integration  and  the  changed  attitude  of 
"international society" makes international support a realistic option of security for the 
Baltic  states.  It  remains  to  be  seen  however,  to  what  extent  Russia,  their  main 
antagonist, has fully comprehended this new state of affairs. The central question of 
security in Europe today is how to make Russia, which is still a large military power, 
into a partner instead of a risk factor. The security of the Baltic states is  ultimately 
dependent upon this.
Nordic Initiatives-Implications for Baltic Security
There are two goals which are prioritized from the Baltic security perspective. One of them  
being  to  create  new  and  close  relationships  with  the  West,  especially  institutionalized  
relationships.  The  other  is  to  break  the  binds  of  East-European  isolation  which  are  
considered to limit Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian sovereignty. The Nordic initiatives in  
the Baltic states are satisfying both of these.
Increasing the Ties to the West
Orientation to the West must be seen in terms of security. The closer the connections to  
Western organizations, the more secure the Balts may feel.
A first and very important tie to the West is through the Nordic countries themselves. The  
Baltic  countries  are  working  on  creating  an  institution  of  cooperation  between  the  
executive powers, the Baltic Council of Ministers, modeled after the Nordic Council. This  
will encourage cooperation between the Baltic and Nordic states. As the EU has stressed  
the need for Baltic cooperation before European integration, it is also a necessary element  
for further European integration.
The Baltic states’ participation in international cooperation and international institutions  
is of great importance for stability on the continent. Estonia and Lithuania are already in  
the Council of Europe and Latvia may soon be a member. The EU is now negotiating a  
free-trade agreement with the Baltic states, among other things, because an agreement of  
this kind is already in force between them and the three Nordic countries that are applying  
for membership in the EU. The Nordic countries insisted that  the agreements with the  
Baltic states remain valid even after applying for membership in the EU. The EU moreover 
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expects that free-trade agreements with the Baltic states can lead to agreements similar to  
those that have been made with Poland and Hungary.1 At a top ministerial meeting of the 
EU in February, when referring to these agreements with the Baltic states, the phrase was 
used, ”with a view to future membership”.2 Judging by these events, the Nordic states could 
be seen as providing links for the Baltic states to the European Union.
All three Baltic states have become members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) pro­
gram. The PFP is initiating a process that might significantly intensify the alliance’s coopera­
tion with the Baltic states. While the Nordic countries have provided a significant amount of 
help in integrating the Baltic states with the EU, contributions to the Baltic states aspirations 
of NATO membership have not been forthcoming. These are, of course, two separate issues 
which  require  completely  different  forms  of  support.  The  Nordic  NATO  countries  may 
change their outlook in the future but for the time being the Baltic states must strengthen this 
link themselves.
The commitment of the Nordic countries to supporting the Baltic states in their efforts to form 
a joint Baltic peace-keeping force within the provisions of UN standards can lead to still fur­
ther ties  with Western international  political  institutions.  If the United Nations is  to have 
some use for the Baltic battalion, it  must first be equipped and trained. A qualified Baltic 
peace-keeping  force  will  need  military aid  and  the  Nordic  countries,  due  to  the  lack  of 
resources  within  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  have  agreed  to  supply  the  basics.  This 
support, however, does not at the present time include weapons.3 The donation of weapons to 
the Baltic states would in actuality contradict the goals of Nordic cooperation which are to act 
as a regional stabilizer and mechanism for reducing friction and eliminating suspicion. Even 
if the Baltic states never receive weapons from the Nordic countries, they may all three find 
another source, such as Israel which has already sold weapons to Estonia and has discussed 
this possibility with Latvia.4 The Baltic states have not received the military protection that 
they have requested but the Nordic countries can contribute to other aspects of their security.
Breaking the Binds of East European Isolation
The  Nordic  countries  can  support  the  Baltic  states  in  their  efforts  to  play  a  ”normal  
1 Oddsson, op. cit. This is an association agreement, the so-called ”Europe-Agreement”.
2 Personal interview with Krister Wahlbäck on February 24, 1994. Mr. Wahlbäck stated that this quote was 
made at a meeting of the European Council of Ministers.
3 Personal interview with Peteris Vaivars on February 15, 1994 in Riga, Latvia. The Minister of Defense of Denmark, 
Hans Hækkerup, stated while in Riga in January 1994 that he would consider the provision of weapons to the 
Baltic joint peace-keeping force.
4 Ibid.
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European  role”  in  European  peace  and  security  policy.  From  a  Nordic  perspective,  
consideration must be taken to the Baltic states legitimate demand of de facto sovereignty  
and  control  over  their  territories,  and  on  the  other  hand,  promote  the  acceptance  and 
integration of Russia as a European state.
The presence of Russian soldiers on the territories of Latvia and Estonia is a threat to all of  
the countries in the Baltic Sea region. The governments of the Nordic countries have shown  
their determination in securing agreements for their timely withdrawal. The Nordic countries  
have also supported the efforts  of  the Baltic  states  to  be comprehended by Europe as  a  
natural part of the grouping within Western and Central European countries. In this way, 
Europe  would  make  it  clear,  for  even  the  most  nationalistic  Russian  government  in  the  
possible future, that a violent attack on the Baltic states would lead to such reactions by  
Europe, including Scandinavia, that it would cost more than it would be worth.
The central problem for the Baltic states after winning formal independence in the fall of  
1991 was to establish and consolidate sovereign control over their territories. Along with the  
major threat of the Russian troops, territorial sovereignty has been violated by the smuggling  
of people, arms, drugs and other goods without sufficient control by the proper authorities.  
The Nordic countries have been the primary source of financial as well as political help in  
lessening  these  threats.  It  is  primarily  the  instability  caused  by  these  threats  that  have 
discouraged Western capital and investments in the Baltic states.
The Nordic role in the Baltic states is not only about insuring Baltic and Nordic security  
interests but also to serve as a bridge-builder or negotiator between Russia and the Baltic  
states.  The acceptance and integration of Russia as a European state is in the long-term 
security interest of the Baltic and Nordic states. Therefore, Baltic security issues must be  
approached from this standpoint. The Nordic states have an interest in acting as negotiators  
between  the  Baltic  states  and  Russia  in  political  relations,  including  the  question  of  
minorities. The nationality issue has a clear international dimension which makes it difficult  
to  separate  domestic  policy from foreign policy and vice versa.  Lithuania has seemed to  
overcome the worst stages of this problem but the way in which Estonia and Latvia handle  
the nationality issue is of considerable importance for their security vis-a-vis Russia and the  
extent to which they can progress in integrating in Western political institutions.
Creating stabile relations between Russia and the Baltic states and promoting democratic 
and economic prosperity,  is  vital  to the security of  the Baltic and Nordic countries. This  
policy is not without risks, but the consequences of inaction and/or the failure of democracy  
in  Russia  could  be  so  dramatic  that  the  eventual  risks  of  Nordic-Baltic  relations  are 
insignificant in comparison.
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In summary, the Nordic countries cannot provide any security guarantees but they can play a  
leading role by reminding the larger European countries of the existence of the Baltic states  
and the responsibility  that  all  of  Europe has to them. This is  the Nordic countries'  most  
important task regarding Baltic security.
Baltic-Nordic Relations§ 34
References
Interviews
Kukuls, G. International Political Organization Division Desk Officer (CSCE/NATO) Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs, Republic of Latvia. February 18, 1994.
Semanis, E. Professor, Head of the Americas and Australia Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic  
of Latvia. February 14, 18 1994.
Vaivars, P. Head of the Nordic States Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Latvia. February 15,  
1994.
Wahlbäck, K. Professor, Security Advisor to the Swedish government. Umeå, Sweden. February 24 and March 
23, 1994.
Official Documents
CSCE Press Release: Establishment in Latvia of the Long-Term Mission of Conference on Security and Coop­
eration in Europe (CSCE) from November 23, 1993.
Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ’The Action Plan of the Government of Finland for the Baltic Countries’.  
September 1993
Latvian government and members of the Saeima (parliament). Proposal on January 31, 1994 to The Baltic  
Assembly regarding a conference of the North Atlantic Alliance Baltic Security Seminar to be held in Sep­
tember 1994.
Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic-Baltic Investment Committee, ’Baltic Investment Program’ agenda #6  
International Cooperation on Assistance to the Baltic countries.
Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release: ”Norge gir kystvaktfartøyer til de Baltiske Land” 
from February 11, 1994.
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ’Sveriges samarbete med Central och Östeuropa’ 1993/1994.
Swedish Riksdagen 1993/1994 9 saml. Nr.6 Utrikesutskottets betänkande 1993/1994:UU6 ’Nordisk Samarbete’.
Books and Articles
Baltic Independent (1994) No 202, Vol.4.
Bildt, C. (1993) ’Sverige och De Baltiska Länderna’. Speech given by Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt on 
November 17, 1993 at the Swedish Foreign Institute.
Birkavs, V. (1994) Speech given by the Prime Minister of Latvia Mr. Valdis Birkavs to the Nordic Council of  
Ministers on March 2, 1994.
Brazauskas, A. (1993) ’The Hopeful Nation - Lithuanian Foreign Policy in the Baltic Sea Region and Europe’.  
Lecture delivered at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. November 25, 1993.
Buzan, B. (1991) People, States and Fear - An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era. Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Dagens Nyheter (1993) September 10.
Dagens Nyheter (1994) January 26, March 3, May 2, May 7.
Dellenbrant, J.Å. (1992) ’The Baltic Connection: Nordic Relations with the Eastern Baltic Sea Region in an EC 
Perspective’ Cerum, Umeå University.
Engberg, J. (1993) ’The Security of the Baltic Republics - A Matter of Attractiveness’. Draft paper prepared for 
presentation at the ISA convention in Acapulco, Mexico on March 23-27 1993.
Faurby, I. (1993) ’Baltic Security: Problems and Policies Since Independence’ in Petersen, N. (ed.) The Baltic 
States in International Politics The Danish Institute of International Studies DJØF Publishing: Copenhagen, 
Denmark.
Hansen, T.F. & Jørgensen, F.O. (1993) ’De Baltiske Lande: På Vej Mod Europa?’, Politica 25 årg nr.4.
Jervell, S. (1991) ’Elementer i en Ny Nordisk Arkitektur’ in Jervell (ed.), Norden i Det Nye Europa. Oslo: De 
Nordiska Utrikespolitiska Instituten.
Jervell, S. (1991) ’Organizing Europe’s Northern Periphery: The Nordic Countries Facing the New Europe’. 
Paper submitted to the conference: ”The Baltic Sea Region: Conflict or Cooperation” in Kiel, Germany 
Baltic-Nordic Relations§ 35
December 6-8, 1991.
Oddsson, D. (1994) Speech made by the Prime Minister of Iceland Davis Oddsson at the 44th session of the 
Nordic Council of Ministers in Stockholm on March 7, 1994.
Waever, O. (1992) ’From Nordism to Baltism’ in Kukk, M. & Jervell, S. & Joenniemi, P. (eds.) The Baltic Sea 
Area- A Region in the Making. Vardings, Sarpsborg.
Wahlbäck, K. (1982) ’The Nordic Region in Twentieth Century European Politics’ in Sundelius, B. (ed.) Foreign 
Policies of Northern Europe. Westview Press:Boulder Colorado.
Wendell H. Kadunce
Baltic-Nordic Relations
Implications for Baltic Security
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 9/1995
Summary
Introductory Remarks
Since the end of the East/West conflict, the Baltic states have found themselves confronted  
with a security dilemma: on the one hand they have been endeavouring, since achieving  
independence in 1991, to sever their bonds to the East and to affiliate themselves more  
closely with the West; on the other these endeavours run counter to Russian interests and 
to the wishes of the West, which focus on Russia. The present Report proposes the view  
that  national  security  is  becoming  more  and  more  dependent  upon  international  and  
transnational circumstances. Against this background it analyzes the special role accruing  
to the Nordic states in the resolution of the Baltic security dilemma within Europe. This  
study has been completed prior to the Russian troop withdrawal having been finished and 
the referendums on joining the EU in Sweden, Finland and Norway having been held.
Findings
1. The  end  of  the  East/West  conflict  has  opened  up  new  options  for  regional  
organisation in Northern Europe. In this context, closer cooperation between 
the Baltic and the Nordic states would appear expedient for three reasons: the 
Nordic states harbour an interest in the stability of the Baltic region, an interest  
that is orientated towards their own security; historical and cultural ties also  
have a role to play, as does the prospect of future economic relations.
2. The Baltic  states'  contemporary  relations  with  Northern  Europe differ  from  
country  to  country.  Since  the  policies  of  the  three  Baltic  republics  are  not  
coordinated, they find themselves vying with each other for Northern European,  
indeed for pan-European support. The first signs of a special relationship with  
the countries of Northern Europe became apparent when these recognised the  
sovereignty  of  the  three  young  republics  while  the  latter  were  still  denied 
recognition by the international community.
3. Economic support for the Baltic republics by the Nordic states comprises a joint  
5-point investment programme, bilateral initiatives, and a free trade agreement 
encompassing  the  two  regions.  Particular  emphasis  is  placed  on  creating  a 
market-economy infrastructure as the basis for the consolidation of economic  
reforms.  This  assistance  is  intended  to  smooth  the  Baltic  republics'  way  to  
membership of the EU.
4. In the political field, the Nordic states are called upon to play the difficult role  
of mediators between Russia and the Baltic. The issues in question are also of  
concern to the security interests  of the Nordic states themselves. Besides, the  
West is exhibiting extreme reserve in political matters, in order not to collide  
with Russian interests. The vacuum that has thus arisen is being filled by the  
countries of Northern Europe.
5. The  countries  of  Northern  Europe  are  playing  an  active  part  in  the  
establishment  of  police  and  border  guard  forces  in  the  Baltic  states.  These  
endeavours  are  directed  towards  stemming  trans-national  problems  such  as  
smuggling, migration and organised crime, which Northern Europe perceives 
as threats emanating from its Baltic neighbours.
6. With their strategy of recruiting the assistance of all the countries bordering on 
the Baltic Sea to improve the ecological situation of their communal waterbody  
- a strategy in which the Baltic states are regarded as priority project candidates  
- the countries of Northern Europe would like to set up a model for an EU-wide 
environmental  policy.  Major  importance  within  this  envisaged  common 
environmental policy is attached also to combatting nuclear pollution risks.
7. In the course of the discussion about the most expedient form of cooperation it  
has become apparent that  both the Baltic  and the Nordic states would be in  
favour of setting up a "Baltic Council" specifically to engage in cooperation  
with  the Nordic  Council.  Even if  the  ongoing transformation  process in  the  
Baltic  is  still  hampering  such  cooperation,  Nordic-Baltic  relations  could  be  
effective in smoothing the progress of the young republics towards Europe in  
the long term, and thus towards a secure future.
8. The present Report propounds the idea of Baltic-Nordic cooperation as the basis  
for the security of the Baltic republics in the face of Russian pretensions. The 
aim of this cooperation would be the natural integration of the Baltic states into  
the European peace and security policy framework, accompanied at the same 
time by the recognition and integration of Russia as a European state.

